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Advantages and Disadvantages of
Immediate or Postponed
Membership into the EU
*Marjan Svetlicic and Bostjan Udovic
The present article explores the options offuture EU member states regarding their ac-
cession to the EU It weighs the benefits of inclusion at the earliest possible convenience
on the one side, and their later accession, on the other side. The analysis is conducted in
three areas of importance for the timing of EU membership, namely the area of political
stability and security, the area of economic development and competitiveness, and the
area of maintenance of national sovereignty and cultural identity. The results indicate
that benefits of early accession outweigh weaknesses and it is thus imperative for the
candidate countries to accede to the EU as soon as possible. This is even more impor-
tant at these times of financial crisis, since the EU does provide a greater financial and
economic stability to its members as opposed to the potential stability they would have
were they to remain outside the EU integration.
Keywords: European integration, advantages/disadvantages of the membership, Politi-
cal and security stability, Welfare creation, Cultural and identity problems.
1. Introduction
The dilemma most candidate countries
face when negotiating the EU membership is
whether to push for its membership as fast as
possible, even if it doesn't feel 100 % ready to
assume all membership implications, or, to
postpone membership until it is actually pre-
pared to assume all obligations of the acquis
communautaire (formal part) and the implica-
tions of unrestricted competition in its market
(actual readiness). Either to postpone member-
ship until all formal and informal preparations
are performed gradually, or, to use member-
ship to speed up such reforms. This was the
dilemma faced by Slovenia when it was nego-
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tiating and it is a dilemma faced by many other
candidate countries negotiating membership
now.
The debate about the advantages and/or
disadvantages of states being members in in-
ternational (economic or political) integrations
is quite provocative and often leads to differ-
ent (theoretical and/or practical) results. The
provocativeness derives from the divergence
between gains and losses of a state entering
into integration. Discussants (and scientists)
disagree whether political or economic inte-
gration brings more gains or losses, and which
measures should be taken to analyze the over-
come of gains over losses and vice versa.
Studies (OEeD 2009; Ilzkovitz 2007) have
shown that integration is nine out of ten times
more beneficial for states that are members of
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integration and for other states that are a part
of integration from an economic point of
view.However, the effects of integration are
not the same for small or large states, or rich
or poor ones. According to Milanovic (2001:
56-57), conglomerates (integrations - B. U.
and M. S.) will be particularly attractive for
small and poor countries and will have trouble
attracting or holding small rich members,
while rich middle sized and non-democratic
countries will stay out. This may imply that
small (middle developed) countries lacking
democracy can try to stay out of integration
groupmgs.
Opinions on political integration are not
so congruent (Ellingsen 1998; Brou and Ruta
2006). In spite of all theoretical debates, the
number of regional economic and political in-
tegrations has risen in the past 50 years. Since
1990, the number of economic integrations
registered with the WTO increased by more
than 800 %. Since 2001, the number of regis-
tered economic integrations has almost dou-
bled (WTO 2009). States recognized that in
this globalised world integration is no longer a
matter of choice, but rather a matter of sur-
vival. For this reason, a state that would like to
compete in the international economy has to
(i) enter into an economic integration, or (ii)
expose its economy to the world market by
liberalizing its market completelly. The first
option allows the state to use the advantages
and disadvantages of integration for a 'softer
transition' from nationally created economic
policy to a common economic policy, while
the second option forces states to adapt instan-
taneously to the global market, which can
cause serious problems in the performance of
the national economy.
Is immediate integration an advantage or
can it also be a disadvantage? Which factors
determine whether integration is advantageous
or disadvantageous? How should states decide
when to enter into integration and which vari-
ables should be included in the cost-benefit
analysis? This is the framework within which
we are going to analyze advantages and disad-
vantages of rapid or delayed membership in
integration. The article seeks to provide an an-
swer to the question, which the advantages of
immediate and postponed membership of inte-
gration are.1 And, upon the basis of this re-
sponse, whether it is better for a state to join
the economic (or political) integration sooner
or later? We base the analysis on three propo-
sitions. Firstly, we assume that globalization
forces push states to strengthen cooperation in
the field of economic and political affairs.
Secondly, we argue that integration among
states also has a spill over effect on neighbour-
ing countries, and furthermore, that this leads
to the stabilization of a wider area than mem-
ber countries only. Finally, we assert that if the
advantages of joining integration overcome
disadvantages, states should join the integra-
tion as soon as possible since the trade off be-
tween advantages and disadvantages could
change in time. Hence, immediate membership
in integration (EU) has more advantages than
disadvantages, especially for small and/or
transition states or states with economic activ-
ity closely integrated with the EU. This is es-
pecially important for the current candidates
like Croatia and Iceland that are part of the
negotiation process and have to accelerate
their pace to "catch the train leaving from the
station". The EU will certainly enlarge its bor-
ders in the following years. If Croatia will
miss this opportunity, the next chance may be
during the next enlargement round with other
current candidate and potential candidate
states (Turkey and the Western Balkan states).
The article is strongly based on the
analysis of Svetlicic (2000).2 The article de-
termined which the internal and external fac-
tors making rapid integration attractive were
and which those speaking in favour of later
integration were. According to Svetlicic
(2000), rapid integration (of Slovenia) into the
EU meant integration in the period of the next
four years, i.e. until 2004, and postponed inte-
gration meant integration after 2010. Such a
time delay was necessary in order to sharpen
the differences between rapid and postponed
integration. It is also important to indicate
from the outset that some negative implica-
tions of rapid integration can turn into benefits
in the long term, either because of a lack of
preparedness in the case of rapid integration or
due to changed external environment condi-
tions. Consequently, it would now mean that
the rapid integration of present candidates
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would take place by 2013, and postponed inte-
gration would occur after 2020.
The conclusion of Svetlicic's article
(2000) was that the advantages of rapid inte-
gration were clearly stronger than disadvan-
tages. Now, nine years later, we have the privi-
lege to evaluate what has happened after five
years of Slovenia's membership in the EU.
Has membership enhanced Slovenia's growth
and what have been the implications in other
areas? Although a comprehensive evaluation is
yet to be prepared, the data has demonstrated
that the implications of membership were in
general very positive," The current global eco-
nomic crisis has demonstrated that had Slove-
nia remained outside the EU (and not being a
part of the Eurozone) the Slovenian economy
would have suffered far more (see Burger and
Svetlicic 2009).
This article evaluates the advantages and
disadvantages of rapid or delayed integration
into the EU as they were relevant at the end of
1990s when Slovenia was negotiating its
membership, with the purpose to see to what
extent such an evaluation can still be relevant
for candidate countries now.
The article is composed of four parts. In
the first part we outline the theoretical frame-
work. The second part is devoted to a brief his-
tory of Slovenian membership. A short over-
view of the international environment in which
negotiating the membership take place is
evaluated in the third part. While the fourth
part of the article presents the 'summary' of
advantages and disadvantages of immediate
membership in an integration (EU) in three
different fields: the field of politics and secu-
rity, economic and monetary affairs and cul-
tural issues. In the conclusion we discuss the
obtained results and evaluate the arguments on
immediate or postponed membership in inte-
gration.
2. Theoretical Framework
The two major questions to be addressed
from a political/security point of view are
whether integration strengthens the democrati-
zation of its members or enhances/erodes their
sovereignty. (Political) integration theory
(Wiener and Diez 2004) does not provide clear
answers on integration issues since it does not
constitute a single framework (Schmitter 2004:
69) for discussion. It is rather a mosaic, where
each theory is only a fragment of what should
be substituted with another one depending on
the point of view (Diez and Wiener 2004: 6ff,
19). The debate on integration theory/ies is a
debate on competing or complementary ap-
proaches (Wiener and Diez 2004: 15). Conse-
quently, pre- integration theories - classical
federalism (Burgess 2004: 26 - 29), functional-
ism (Mitrany 1943) and transactionalism
(Deutsch 1970) - 'born' before 1960, and con-
temporary theoretical paradigms - neofunc-
tionalism (Hass 1958; Schmitter 2004: 46),
intergovemmentalism (Hoffman 1995; Mo-
ravcsik 1997), law integration theory, discur-
sive integration theory (Waever 2004,see
Brglez and Kajnc 2009: 406) should be under-
stood as approaches and not as eclectic theo-
ries, because of the differences in their initial
positions (Diez and Wiener 2004: 16).
Federalists argue that integration should
preserve the states' sovereignty and national
interests, while functionalists advocate that
partial national interests should be replaced by
common interests. The 'bridging theory' of
transactionalism links functionalism and fed-
eralism view the key role of the integration in
providing a stable community of member-
states. The theory of intergovemmentalism
derives from the classical prepositions and
emphasizes that states remain the basic actors
within the integration, but cooperate in the
field of common interest. On the other hand,
contemporary theoretical approaches to inte-
gration (stemming from other social sciences)
explain integration as a process based on
common 'constitutive and regulative norms' or
'discursive practices of political elites' (Risse
2004: 162-163; Haltern 2004: 178-179;
Waever 2004: 200 - 206).
Milanovic (2001) evaluates the relation-
ship between sovereignty, democracy, wealth
and international agreements (as a proxy for
political openness). He establishes that "the
equilibrium sovereignty level of poor, rich and
small democratic states wishing to become in-
tegration members is bound to be small
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whether they are independent countries or mem-
bers of a conglomerate. The key gain from inde-
pendence is not sovereignty, but the ability to
switch from a poor to a rich conglomerate (like
Slovenia did - B. U. and S. M). Greater wealth
per capita is strongly associated with countries'
acceptance of binding international agreements.
More democratic countries will, under ceteris
paribus conditions (i.e. given domestic market
endowments), select lower level of sovereignty.
Hence conglomerates will be particularly attrac-
tive for small and poor members and have trou-
bles attracting or holding small rich members"
(2001: 56). Consequently we can conclude that
the stronger the ambition to stimulate growth
and increase the wealth of the population the
stronger the argument for immediate member-
ship irrespective of the issue of sovereignty. The
second conclusion from Milovanovi6's analysis
is that the more democratic the country the more
it will be pushing for immediate membership.
But when it becomes rich it will again evaluate
the trade off between benefits and costs, between
the rights of 'small members' and net payments
to the budget ofthe community.
The major issue of the traditional theory
of economic integration (Beers 1941; Bye
1950; Viner 1950 and Balassa 1962) is why
states want to join economic integrations.
Theories address the issue by differentiating
between static (trade creation and trade diver-
sion) and dynamic effects of integration. If
trade creation outpaces trade diversion and if
dynamic (expected) effects are greater than
costs, countries join the integration grouping
(cf. Robson 1998: 26-27). The issue that has
to be resolved is not only about net gains, but
rather whether such gains are higher in the
short-term or whether it is better to postpone
membership in order to maximise gains in the
future. More simply, the reflection is whether
the dynamic effects (by defmition achieved in
the long run) are more or less important than
the static ones, or whether the dynamic effects
are so important that immediate membership
would present a more attractive solution than
postponed membership, implying that we
would like to achieve the dynamic effects as
soon as possible. What can therefore be ex-
pected in this regard (see Table I)?
Table 1: Static and dynamic effects of creating an economic integration
Static effects Dynamic effects
• Trade creation/trade diversion. • Increased competition enhances produc-
• Administration savings. tivity, improving allocation of resources
• Improvement of collective terms of trade. and decrease prices.
• Increased bargaining power in the interna- • Economies of scale, scope and specializa-
tional community. tion enhance competitiveness.
• Stabilization of the economic neighbour- • Access to new technology.
hood and main trade partners. • Growth in output increases welfare.
• Gaining resource allocation efficiency. • Cohesion and convergence (following
stabilization) among member-states.
Source: Salvatore (2007: 345-347); Robson (1998: 37-40, 84-90).
The theory posits that the overall dy-
namic effects are five to six times more impor-
tant than static gains (see Salvatore 2001 :
335). This is even more relevant for all repub-
lics of the former-Yugoslavia, since they have
enjoyed the benefits of special agreements
with European Union since the early days and
Association or Stabilisation agreements after-
wards (signed in 2001). They allowed the con-
sumption of a large part of static trade effects.
The decisive factor in this economic sense is
therefore whether dynamic effects make rapid
membership better than postponed member-
ship. The theory clearly points out that the
sooner the country integrates the sooner it is
able to reap the dynamic gains. In the case of
the Western Balkan countries (Croatia) this
factor is even stronger due to the consumption
of a large part of static trade effects in its non-
membership status.
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3. Historical Background of
Slovenia's Accession to the European
Union
During the last several years of the for-
mer-Yugoslavia, Slovenia argued that it was
necessary for Yugoslavia to join the EU. How-
ever, forces in Yugoslavia that had the power
to make a decision about potential accession
were opposed, and shortly after the dissolution
of Yugoslavia, Slovenia proceeded with ac-
tions towards entering the EU. Slovenia sub-
mitted an entrance request to the EU in 1992
(Government of Slovenia 2009).4 The request
was followed by harsh pre-accession negotia-
tions, especially with Italy which blocked
Slovenian accession to the EU owing to the
"unresolved" position ofthe Italian minority in
Slovenia (Kosin 2000).5 After four years of
tough negotiations with Italy and the Slove-
nian acceptance of the "Spanish compromise",
Slovenia signed the Association Agreement
(hereafter AA) on 10th June 1996. In 1997,
Slovenia became a part of the Luxembourg
group," which got the green light to start nego-
tiations. The AA came into effect in 1999;
while the negotiations were concluded in 2002
when it was determined that Slovenia will en-
ter the EU on May the l " 2004 (Government
of Slovenia 2009).
During the accession process one of the
key questions that determined the discussion
of Slovenia's membership in the EU were the
advantages of immediate or postponed mem-
bership. Even though public opinion was quite
favourable towards entering the EU/ Euro
scepticism was not completely absent (Pinteric
2009).8 A large part of the Euro scepticism
was caused by political and economic issues.
The main issue concerning the membership of
Slovenia from a political perspective was the
issue of the democratic deficit in the EU (Pi-
kalo 2009) and the loss of sovereignty. While
in the economic sphere, the loss of control
over monetary and exchange rate policy was
listed as the largest deficiency of Slovenia's
membership in the EU.
The next part of the discussion will pre-
sent arguments for immediate or postponed
membership of a country in the EU and the
role of external factors, the impact of global
environment. This analysis is strongly based
on the article of Svetlicic (2000), but from a
'five-years later' perspective. The analysis
which follows will be more generalized" and
consequently applicable and useful for future
member states.
4. Global Environment
Assessing the potential implications of
rapid or slow integration in the EU depends to
a large extent on the international environment
and its potential development in, at least, next
10 years. In 2000, Svetlicic established that
most external factors strongly supported fast
integration into the EU. Tectonic changes al-
ready forecasted in 2000 and enhancing glob-
alization changed the configuration of factors
of competitiveness favouring knowledge, in-
novation and the speed of adjustments to the
external environment (particularly important
for small countries). Slower growth rates were
predicted, and the pace of globalization would
slow only in the case of major war, a great cri-
ses like the one in 1929, or in the event that the
world would not be able to change the distri-
bution of costs and benefits of globalization
more evenly. If globalization is here to stay
and regionalization is the most practical realis-
tic manifestation of globalization, then rapid
integration in the EU is a normal response,
particularly for small countries, Svetlicic as-
serted.
At the same time, Svetlicic was strongly
advocating "walking on two legs", integration
and regional diversification of the economy.
He argued that integration in the EU is not the
only strategy, but that regional diversification
of economic cooperation with the most dy-
namic parts of the world's emerging econo-
mies is a must. Developments in the last nine
years have proven this proposal correct and
can now have only a stronger role in view of
BRICS (S for South Africa) becoming a major
source of the dynamics of the global economy.
Almost all arguments described in Svet-
licic (2000) are still valid today, and even
more so during the economic crisis. Although
the EU has not avoided the crisis, its social
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model has made it more resistant to the crisis
through automatic inbuilt social stabilizers.
Consequently, less stimulus packages were
needed and small and less developed member
countries enjoyed the benefits of EU funds to
cope with the crises. The adoption of the Euro
and the coherence of monetary policy also
made countries less vulnerable. Although EU
members have not avoided the crises, of
course, it would be safe to assume that particu-
larly small and less advanced members would
fare much worse outside the EU. The change-
ability of the external environment therefore
makes fast integration into the EU even more
important today than it did when Slovenia was
negotiating its membership.
However, it was not only economics, but
also integration into security and political
structures made integration a rather attractive
solution. Due to tectonic changes and conse-
quent political instabilities, and last but not
least the enlargement fatigue, waiting too long
for membership could mean postponing it for a
much longer time than was previously estab-
lished. Currently, with living tectonic changes
in motion (e.g. the threat of terrorism after
September 2001), the security and political
umbrella of membership can play an even
more important role. Postponing the member-
ship could mean waiting for other Western
Balkan countries or even for Turkey. Or, as
predicted in Svetlicic (2000), the EU could get
tired of enlargement and could start thinking
of new forms of association instead of mem-
bership owing to the problems that it already
has with new members. The EU Enlargement
is therefore a historic opportunity and the
doors may not remain open permanently. They
can be only partly opened in the future (Svet-
liCic 2000: 48). The ongoing institutional re-
forms and the global crisis make all these ar-
guments in favour of fast integration today
even stronger and the costs of delaying the
membership even higher.
5. Political and Security Stability
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia
and the establishment of new independent
states on its territory, security and po litical
stability played a more prominent role than it
does today. Slovenia started its accession
process at a time when wars were raging in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conse-
quently, the political and security stability of
the region was one of the key determinants of
Slovenia's accession process. However, in the
last 20 years political and security determi-
nants have changed significantly. On one
hand, the Western Balkans region has been
(more or less) stabilised, while there has been
a change in global security, on the other, the
war against terrorism started in 2001, there
was an attack on Iraq, two large terrorist at-
tacks occurred in the EU (United Kingdom
and Spain); Europe replaced the UN forces in
Kosovo etc. These changes in the world's po-
litical and security system call for the
strengthening of political stability in all re-
gions. Table 2 shows the advantages of imme-
diate accession to the EU.
Table 2: Advantages of immediate entering in the EU for political and security stability
1) EU Member states co-create the political and security system in Europe.
2) Member-states improve their visibility in the international community.
3) Small states have a chance to push forward their own and co-create common Community
interests, far beyond what would be possible in the case of non-membership.
4) Membership in the EU reinforces the negotiating position of a state towards non-members.
5) Membership in the EU promotes the transition and stabilisation of the political system mak-
ing it more transparent and enhancing democratic dialogue instead of politics of division.
6) Membership enhances national security, as states become part of the CFSP.
7) Membership stimulates better implementation of the rule oflaw.
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The advantages from Table 2 are funda-
mental advantages for all new member-states
becoming a part of the ED agenda setting and
not being the observers of what others decide.
One could say that Switzerland or Norway do
not have as much to gain, since their coopera-
tion with the ED is already at a very high
level. This reasoning is only partially true, be-
cause states that are not officially part of the
ED do not have the possibility to participate in
the creation of ED policies which to a very
large extent affects their development due to
such strong economic integration with the ED
space. They have to follow what 'Brussels'
decides without having the opportunity to co-
create such policies. Hence, they have fewer
possibilities to influence the decision-makers
and the decision-making process to reach their
goals. On the other hand, integration of small
states gives them a comparative advantage, as
they have the possibility to put forward new
ideas and actions that would not be possible
outside the integration. Consequently, such
actions warrant small states to have a more
stable political and security environment.
Indeed, the accession to the ED does not
solely promise advantages. The principal dis-
advantage of entering the ED is the partial loss
of traditional sovereignty.i" The discussion on
the extent of loosing state sovereignty is aimed
at quantifying acceptable and unacceptable
levels of losses, which, in other words, makes
a discussion known as the "half- full or half-
empty bottle". The optimist would say that a
bottle is "half-full", while the pessimist will
remark that it is "half-empty". It is evident
from the theories that integration calls for sac-
rifices. However, if gains outweigh costs or
even if costs of integrating are lower than costs
of the best alternative, integration is the right
decision. In this sense, the debate about loos-
ing sovereignty is less important. In this glob-
alising world almost all decisions should be
taken in cooperation with other states. I I There-
fore, the present reality confronts us with the
fact that state sovereignty cannot be under-
stood as Westphalian sovereignty anymore.
Finally, sovereignty is not necessarily endan-
gered in integrations, but rather modified.
States are still the primary bearers of power
since they are still the only subjects in the in-
ternational community with policy adoption
powers even in the name of the integration.
Therefore, the ED is not an alienated forma-
tion that took the sovereignty away from
member-states; instead it is more a reflection
of the sovereignties of all member-states. Nev-
ertheless, it may seem that sovereignty is the
only issue discussed as a disadvantage of im-
mediate membership in the ED. In Table 3 we
list some possible disadvantages of joining the
ED as perceived by the public or stemming
from debates.
Table 3: Disadvantages of immediately entering the ED; political and security dimension
1) Loss of state sovereignty.
2) Haste can erode own negotiating position making the country vulnerable to political pres-
sures from other members.
3) Absence of national political consolidation can damage the reputation ofthe state in the ED.
4) Ignorance or lack of experience about policy and decision-making in the ED (a lack of soft
powers) makes potential influence in Brussels less than the one which can possibly be
achieved in the case of later membership (longer process ofleaming by doing).
5) The concentration of the membership costs can reduce public support for entering the ED.
The major task of policy makers is
firstly to asses whether the erosion of bar-
gaining power of rapid integration out-
weighs the chances of gaining some benefits
in a longer negotiating process by insisting
on something considered as a vital national
interest. Secondly, whether such an insistence
would postpone the membership beyond the fea-
sible historic opportunity or until the policy of
the ED might change making the membership
"fee" more expensive and/or harder to achieve.
These are hard political choices.
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increased members' trade by 127-146 % after
10-15 years, while membership in the European
Free Trade Association (EFT A) increased trade
for no more than 35 % (Bergstrand 2008).13
However, the economic effects of integration are
not only positive. In states where industry is not
consolidated and competitive, entering into the
integration can cause serious social difficulties
(such as unemployment, an increase in health
and social expenses, etc.). Table 4 shows the ad-
vantages of immediate membership of a state on
its economy and welfare.
6. Economic Stability and
Prosperity
Most of the integrations that exist to-
day started out as economic integrations
(Kostevc 2009: 170). States decide whether
or not they wish to enter the economic inte-
gration on the basis of the cost-benefit
analysis. Many studies have demonstrated
that economic integration enhances wel-
fare.12 For example, the study of Baier,
Bergstrand, Egger and McLaughlin (2008)
ascertains that the 'establishment' of the EU
Table 4: Advantages of immediate membership of a state in the EU from the economic perspec-
tive
1) If the net effect of joining the integration is positive then the welfare of the citizens rises.
2) Increased export to the EU, since trade creation would outpace trade diversion.
3) Speeding up transition and restructuring.
3) Faster creation ofa new economic structure of the economy by specialisation.
4) Increased competitiveness is a basis for creating a knowledge-based society (see Udovic
and Bucar 2008).
5) Entering the EU abolishes the weakened local monopolies.
6) More inward FDI.
7) Faster transformation.
8) EU financial assistance when a state encounters some economic or fmancial problems.
9) Access to the EU funds.
1'0)Coordination of monetary and fiscal policies grants a stable framework for the develop-
ment of the economy.
11)Enhancing specialisation and gaining the advantages of a niche economy.
12)Enhanced competition in the fmancial sector can enhance its competitiveness.
All of the above mentioned advantages
have one common denominator, which is the
increase of competitiveness and, as a result,
the lowering of prices. The fmal result will be
the improvement of welfare. However, adapta-
tions and changes in the economy when enter-
ing an integration (e.g. the closure of uncom-
petitive firms) can lead to a decline in welfare
as well. This decline should be of a short-term
nature, since competitive industries will
emerge and welfare will consequently in-
crease. Therefore, it is necessary to assess all
the advantages and disadvantages prior to en-
tering an integration and prepare for it in ad-
vance. In doing this we must also be aware of
the fact that the disadvantages of immediate
accession to the EU, such as closing down en-
terprises because of their lack of competitive-
ness, can be an advantage in terms of faster
adjustment to global competition by improving
the allocation of resources faster than other-
wise would be the case. Table 5 lists some dis-
advantages of immediate membership in an
integration.
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Table 5: Disadvantages of immediate membership in the EU from an economic perspective
1) Branches/firms of 'special' or 'national' interest can be closed, as they are not competitive
and have not had enough time to adjust.
2) The technological lags can be perpetuated.
3) FDI can drive out domestic firms due to lack of time to adjust.
4) Loosing banks in domestic ownership, because they are too small to compete with Euro-
pean giants.
5) Underperformance in obtaining the EU funds (lack of knowledge on how to do it).
6) Incapacitating the use of exchange rates as development tool.
The list of disadvantages for immediate
membership of a country in an integration
shows us that too hasty a membership can
cause serious problems in the restructuring and
adjustment of the economy. It is thus neces-
sary that a state, entering the integration try to
restructure its economy before the accession,
otherwise serious changes after the entrance
could be harsher and unaccepted by the public
or even accompanied by revolts and riots.
However, the costs of rapid membership
should also be evaluated compared to the op-
portunity costs of non-membership with the
"best alternative to a negotiated alternative".
Such an evaluation can demonstrate that a fast
membership, even implying additional costs, is
still less costly than the best available alterna-
tive in a globalised economy. States must
know the alternatives of not joining an integra-
tion. In a world where globalisation is at the
centre of whichever economic decision, states,
particularly small ones, are not left with many
options. If they do not integrate, they neverthe-
less have to liberalise their own economy if
they wish to survive. Compared to the total
liberalisation scenario, integration also offers a
certain collective 'protection formula', since
integrations always protect their members
economically and politically (Svetlicic 2000).
This 'protection' is especially important now
in times of financial crisis.
7. Cultural and Identity Questions
The debate about cultural diversity and
identity problems after joining an integration is
always on the top of every discussion table.
Although cultural dialogue and cultural diver-
sity are generally well promoted, when it
comes to specific issues, many dilem-
mas/problems appear. The major dilemma
concerning cultural and identity issues is
whether a) integration implies loosing of own
identity and culture, or whether b) integration
enhances possibilities for promoting the cul-
ture and identity of a small state. Firstly,
states, especially small states or states in tran-
sition are concerned that integration means
loosing their own cultural and identity heri-
tage. This concern derives from the concept of
culture and identity as exposed in the "Spring
of Nations 1848" that is strictly linked with the
Westphalian concept of sovereignty which de-
termined statecraft in the zo" century. Sec-
ondly, fear ofthe EU also derives from the EU
structure. 27 member-states can sometimes be
seen as a melting pot in which small states in
particular do not have the possibility to pre-
serve their own cultural uniqueness. The cul-
ture and identity question of these states are
submerged under the cultural activities and
questions of larger states. On the other hand,
data show that joining the EU has a great in-
fluence on the promotion of culture and iden-
tity of member-states. Most EU institutions
give a special impact on preserving culture and
identity particularities (cf Trichet 2009). In
the past, a lot of programmes were launched to
help preserve cultural and identity heritage,
focused especially on promoting regional and
minority languages (EC 2006). The DG on
Education and Culture has an action pro-
gramme listing all activities of the EU for pre-
serving national and the EU cultural platforms
and actions (EC 2009).14 Table 6 shows some
advantages in the field of culture and identity.
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Table 6: Cultural and identity advantages of becoming a member of a political integration
1) Citizens acquire all rights and duties belonging to the citizens of the EU.
2) Membership grants better diplomatic and consular protection.
4) Promotion of own culture and language, which becomes one of the official languages
of the EU.
5) Influence in the decision-making process.
6) More intensive cooperation with cognate cultures and languages.
7) Citizens can travel more freely and study abroad (possibilities to apply for scholar-
ships). They can promote own culture and language abroad.
8) The knowledge of a country's culture can increase the influx of tourists and its national
Income.
9) Improvements of the political culture and democratic behaviour in the home country.
As explained above, disadvantages in
the field of culture and states' identity are
closely linked to states' sovereignty. Table 7
shows some possible negative effects on cul-
ture and national identity after becoming a
member of the EU.
Table 7: Disadvantages of the membership in the EU
1) Possible loss of own culture originality, because of the amalgamation among cultures
within the EU.
2) Foreign cultures can suffocate a national culture - artists go 'with the European flow'.
3) Openness of public sector and universities force the use of foreign languages (espe-
cially English) that could lead to pauperism of the native/home language.
In the field of cultural and identity is-
sues, advantages surely prevail over disad-
vantages. The key advantage often indicated
as a big disadvantage is the question of lan-
guage and home sovereignty. The first is re-
lated to the use of one's own language in the
'Brussels reality', because as it is known, all
languages are equal, but most of the deci-
sion-making process is frequently under-
taken in English or French. Of course, states
can use their own language, but this will in-
clude more translations and the decision-
making process would be even slower than it
currently is. However, the common practice
in 'Brussels' is that when a state is presiding
over the Council, the presiding officer
speaks in their own mother tongue. This is a
very effective promotion of a country's own
language.I5 The other question of home-
country sovereignty was dealt with in the
previous parts of the discussion. We believe
that at this point we should draw attention to
promotion of national interest within the EU.
All political actions should be taken to in-
crease the welfare of the common people of
a state, so we argue that sovereignty, as es-
tablished in the Westphalian system, should
be replaced by the new task of promoting
national identity and culture. Within the
framework of the EU, a member state could
do this better and more efficiently. States
from the European continent stem from the
same Greek-Jewish-Christian tradition.
Common roots create a common identity
framework. Therefore, national identity
within the framework of the EU can be pre-
served in a much easier way among member
states than within the framework of more
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than 200 states existing in the world today.
Such is also the experience of Slovenian
membership. In spite of very strong fears
about loosing cultural identity, five years of
membership have demonstrated that more
doors have opened than closed. Many critics
of membership on such grounds have real-
ised that it is up to us to start using addi-
tional European channels for the promotion
of national culture, channels which have not
been available before.
8. Conclusions
The scope of this article was to pre-
sent arguments of immediate or postponed
membership (accession) in the EU in the
context of global environment. The analysis
is focused on three fields (politics and secu-
rity dis/advantages, economic
dis/advantages and cultural and identity
dis/advantages) that are, in our opinion, key
areas where advantages or disadvantages of
immediate integration in the EU should be
discussed. 'Field-analysis' shows that the
advantages of immediate membership in the
EU, especially for small and/or high middle
income transition states, overcome the dis-
advantages.
Although the international context has
changed dramatically after Slovenia negoti-
ated its membership, nowadays it works
even more strongly in favour of rapid rather
than slow integration. The crisis has clearly
demonstrated the advantages of being a part
of Euro zone, as well as the European social
model's amortization policies for external
shocks. Although they proved insufficient
for imbalances of the size the present crises
imposed on them, it is still better than not
having them at all. The current crisis has
clearly shown that slow restructuring of a
state's own economy can prove more costly
if done later to when it should have been
done. The situation is even worse if the re-
structuring process is determined and forced
by external environment (like the present
crisis), which can seriously damage the re-
structuring of sectors and provoke serious
economic and social consequences. Since
we will not be immune to the crises in the
future, rapid membership, speeding up re-
forms and the restructuring of firms make
economies of candidate countries better
prepared to cope even with a crises similar
to the one we are facing now. In addition,
globalization and regionalization like Euro-
pean integration is going to stay with us in
spite of the severe backlash to globalization
in general in the present crises. It will only
have to be modified in such a way as to al-
low more equitable distribution of its costs
and benefits. Higher vulnerabilities and un-
predictability also make membership in the
EU better than staying outside as a way of
collective amortisation of inbuilt shocks and
uncertainties in the global capitalist econo-
mies.
However, tectonic changes with eco-
nomic power shifting to Asia make the EU
membership insufficient. Countries have to
strengthen their cooperation with these
countries that will to develop much faster
than the "old" industrial countries and thus
will become the engine of global growth in
the future Asian century. Strengthening co-
operation with BRICS is therefore a neces-
sary compliment to European integration if
a country wants to keep high growth rates in
its efforts to converge with the old members
of the EU. Faster growth rates of (emerg-
ing) economies strongly correlate with
growth rates of the countries trading with
them and of richer or developed countries
(see Aurora and Vamvakidis 2005). The
second argument reinforces integration in
the EU (more developed countries), while
the first supports the geographical diversifi-
cation of economic ties with fast growing
countries.
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Table 8: Advantages and disadvantages of immediate and postponed membership in the EU -
small country case
Immediate membership Postponed membership
Advantages • Country becomes better known and •
more transparent.
• Diminished role of partitocracy. •
• Co-creator of European (security)
architecture.
• Historical opportunity (will the EU •
doors remain open)?
• Enhancing state security position.
• Restructuring and enhanced transi-
tion process.
• Dynamic effects of an integration ..
Source: Adapted on the basis of Svetlicic (2000: 67).
Disadvantages • Worse negotiating position towards •
the EU member-states.
• Transition could be speeded up, but
transition costs can increase.
• Uncompetitive branches bankrupt •
and provoke welfare problems.
• Particular advantageous bilateral •
trade agreements are substituted by
EU Agreements, implying loosing •
of special treatment on such makets.
Although the advantages are greater,
the disadvantages should by no means be
neglected, since potential remission of dis-
advantages can reduce the influence of ad-
vantages or even convert advantages into
disadvantages. Furthermore, one can convert
disadvantages into advantages if one knows
them and is prepared to deal with them in
advance. The basic argument frequently
stressed as a disadvantage is the argument of
'loosing a nation's own sovereignty'. We
argue that this argument is based on weak
foundations for two reasons. Firstly, sover-
eignty in the modern international commu-
nity, especially after the Second World War,
has changed in its essence. States could not
and should not act for themselves as they
acted in previous centuries, but their politics
(policy) should be congruent with the inter-
More time to adapt to the
Maastricht criteria.
Possible social costs of states'
transition are extended on a
long-term basis.
Larger inflow of structural
funds.
Slower reforms and subsidiz-





Security problems - being part
of an unstable region.
More modest FDI inflow.
ests of other nations in the framework of in-
ternational law and the international com-
munity's interests due to a strong interde-
pendence and the "flattening" of the world
(Friedman 2005). Secondly, globalization
has converted economic independence into
economic interdependence (Keohane and
Nye 1989), meaning that states no longer
have the ability to decide on their own
(economy) alone, but instead have to take
into consideration 'outside' environmental
limitations and actions. Such an altered un-
derstanding of sovereignty establishes a new
framework for discussing the profitability or
uselessness of joining the EU.
This discussion on advantages or dis-
advantages is especially important for the
states emerged from the ex-Yugoslavia,
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which must decide whether their future will
be with in the EU or not. We argue that
there is simply no reasonable alternative to
joining the EU (see Svetlicic 1996a, 1996b
and 1998 for alternatives) as they are a part
of European history, while at the same time,
the territory of former-Yugoslav states is
the only part of Europe that obviates the EU
to round off. 16 However, some interest
groups in those states strongly oppose
membership in the EU, since they believe
that the EU will not be advantageous for
their country. The key misunderstanding
derives from the EU's role in the reform
process in these states. Interest groups
wrongly suppose that not joining the EU
will preserve their own economic capacity
and characteristics. But this seems unrealis-
tic. As explained, the alternative to the EU
for these states is total liberalization of their
home economy. But reservations that one
can have regarding the EU membership in
terms of yielding part of its sovereignty or
negative effects it might have on local firms
(closing down due to a lack of competitive-
ness) could in the case of total liberalization
even be much stronger. The EU is less lib-
eralized, it selectively protect its members
from the outside world. Total liberalization
would absolutely enhance productivity, but
the immediate impact on the economy could
be much harsher. Perhaps the major eco-
nomic advantage is that the EU membership
in fact speeds up the transformation of can-
didates' economies which would otherwise
occur far slower. The membership can
therefore be regarded as an instrument for
speeding up the needed market-oriented re-
forms. The other argument for joining the
EU is the capability of the EU to be an im-
portant player in the international arena. Be-
ing a part of such an integration gives a
state more possibilities for the production
and promotion of its own interests, because
partial (national) interests 'could be sold',
leveraged as common (EU) interests. Within
this framework, states could even create a
more favourable environment for its devel-
opment ill the political and economic
spheres.
The EU is the right choice for small
states that would like to prosper and to de-
velop faster, but still in a sustainable man-
ner. Faster and sustainable development
would lead to higher welfare for all citizens.
Promoting and achieving higher welfare
should be a question of vital importance for
all political elites.
From the 'five-years-later' perspective
experiences of Slovenia's membership in
the EU enhanced its transition and competi-
tiveness in competitive branches, while, on
the other hand, uncompetitive branches
faced serious problems in their transition
process. Nevertheless, the transitions and
adjustments needed in order to become a
member of the EU are much more transi-
tion, welfare enhancing specific, than the
EU specific, because it should be done to
become a market economy and not because
the adherence to acquis communitaire. Our
analysis clearly demonstrates the advan-
tages of rapid and not postponed member-
ship of the EU although there are costs of
rapid integration as well. Fast integration
can speed up needed reforms although each
country can still follow its own model that
will enhance economic prosperity, cultural
coherence and political stability because
there are no "one fit all models/strategies".
Blaming others - a policy frequently ap-
plied in many candidate countries by politi-
cians unwilling to take the necessary re-
forms who consequently blame Brussels or
other countries for their own wrong doings
- can finally prove to be a very counterpro-
ductive policy. Firstly, because it can post-
pone the needed reforms, and secondly, be-
cause it can jeopardise the outcome of a ref-
erendum if it is needed for final member-
ship in the EU if the EU or its policies were
the scapegoat for own bad policies for too
long.
•
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1 We are going to concentrate on the advantages of immediate
and postponed membership in integration, because the advan-
tages of immediate membership are basically disadvantages of
postponed membership and vice versa.
2 Svetlicic (2000: 38-70). The article is divided in three parts. In
the first part, Svetlicic evaluated the external environment in
which Slovenia started to negotiate in the 90s. The second part
of the article was a macro analysis of what were the implica-
tions of rapid or delayed (postponed) membership of Slovenia
in the EU, while the third part of the article analysed the advan-
tages and disadvantages in selected sectors, such as banking,
telecommunications, transport, education and science, tourism,
employment and social dimensions and the environment.
3 But it is impossible to identify to which extent these results are
EU integration specific or transition or external environment
specific. GDP growth rates have accelerated from 4.3 % in
2004 to 6.8 % in 2007 what can largely be explained by the EU
growth rates fluctuations (see Mencinger 2009). GDP per capita
also increased from 13,599 to 18,219 in the same period to
reach 90% of EU 27 average. Exports to EU increased from
66% to 70.6 % while imports decreased. However current ac-
count deteriorated. Unemployment also decreased but started
to increase due to present crises. Competitiveness has also
slightly increased. Structural changes have been accelerated
but still much too slow. Inward FDI increased but less than ex-
pected while outward internationalization substantially acceler-
ated. (see more in Burger and Svetlicic, 2009)
4 The Cooperation Agreement and the Protocol on financial
cooperation between the European Economic Community and
the Republic of Slovenia was signed on 5th April 1993 and
entered into force on the 1st September 1993 (AA 1996).
5 Italy argued that Slovenia is not the successor of the Osimo
agreement that finally, after 30 years, determined the state line
between Italy and Yugoslavia and compensation for the prop-
erty of Italian citizens, which was left on the territory of ex-
Yugoslavia after their option for Italy.
6 Members of the Luxembourg group were Czech Republic,
Estonia, Poland, Cyprus, Hungary and Slovenia.
7 Public support to enter the EU never fell below 50 % (Gov-
ernment of Slovenia). 89, 64 % of electors supported Slovenia's
membership of the EU in a referendum on the 23rd March 2004
(National Electoral Commission 2009).
8 A noted, Siovenian economist Joze Mencinger led the Euro
scepticism campaign in Slovenia with his ideas. On the 1st
March 2004 (just 2 months before Slovenia entered into the
EU), Mencinger was discussing in a public forum on Slovene
competitiveness exposed that "after the 1st May Slovenia will
have much less sovereignty that it had had in Yugoslavia". Ac-
cording to Mencinger, the EU was defined as "a self-interested
community of states with partial interests of the political elite, far
away from the public" (Mencinger 2004). Despite his state-
ments, Mencinger did not perceive himself as a Euro sceptic,
because, as he emphasized, "he did not know the alternative to
the EU".
Waever, O. (2004), "Discursive Approaches", in Wiener, A. and
T. Diez. Eds. (2004) European Integration Theory. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Wiener, A. and T. Diez (2004), European integration theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.




9 The original article of Svetlicic (2000) evaluated the external
environment, then the implications of rapid or delayed member-
ship on a more macro level, and thirdly on the level of selected
sectors such as banking, telecommunications, transport, edu-
cation and science, tourism, employment and social dimen-
sions, environment, culture and sports as well as EMU.
10 Form the 'sovereignty issue' the idea of entering into integra-
tion, especially if the integration is annotated as 'political', can
issue strong opposition. Firstly, because strengthening political
cooperation means cooperating on all political issues that tackle
every-day life. Secondly, because political decisions should be
coordinated and consensual, which means that 'national inter-
est' could frequently be replaced by 'common interest.' Some-
times this common interest can also be contrary to the national
interest. And thirdly, because, political integration implies the
transfer of power to the - usually - newly established organ
(the EU Commission in the EU) that decides in the name of the
people for the people. This 'alienation' of the decision-making
process can be perceived as a loss of decision-making power
at the symbolic level. This symbolism is much more relevant in
the short-term than a long-term basis, because people tend to
adapt their expectation and become more broad-minded in the
long-run. That is why the support of the public (e. g. referen-
dum) is necessary before entering into a political integration.
11 The rapid regionalisation and globalisation in the 20th cen-
tury shook the fundamental approach of a nation state, because
states voluntarily started to abandon a part of their sovereignty
for their accessions to different integrations - from defence
alliances to economic integration communities. The key works
of the 90's - the "Clash of Civilisations" (Huntington 1992) and
the "The End of the Nation State" (Ohmae 1995) - denote that
the current system is far from being Westphalian, at least not as
it was understood three centuries ago, but is rather becoming
ever more merged in (ideological or economic) blocks.
12 One among them is the Cecchini report 1992 on the benefits
of a single market.
13 Available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1623.
Bergin and Glick (2005) confirmed the classical axiom that inte-
gration stimulates trade, but at the same time observed that
even though it is expected that within integration prices have to
decrease, the situation is not so straight-forward. The level of
prices depends on various other variables and not only on trade
expansion.
14 Even more a symptomatic action was done in the mandate
of the current EC. The DG for education and culture has been
directed by the commissioner ~efcovic, who comes from the
small transition state of Slovakia.
15 We should not forget that every act should be translated in
all languages of the EU.
16 With this we mean that only states from the ex-Yugoslavia
(except Slovenia) create a blank zone that is not included in the
EU. All neighbouring countries are part of the EU. The admis-
sion of the ex-Yugoslav states would therefore establish a geo-
graphical whole.
